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ABSTRACT
R&D is an uncertain activity with highly skewed outcomes.  Nonetheless, most recent empirical studies
and modeling estimates of the potential of technological change focus on the average returns to research
and development (R&D) for a composite technology and contain little or no information about the
distribution of returns to R&D—which could be important for capturing the range of costs associated
with climate change mitigation policies—by individual technologies.  Through an empirical study
of patent citation data, this paper adds to the literature on returns to energy R&D by focusing on the
behavior of the most successful innovations for six energy technologies, allowing us to determine
whether uncertainty or differences in technologies matter most for success.  We highlight two key
results.  First, we compare the results from an aggregate analysis of six energy technologies to technology-by-technology
results.  Our results show that existing work that assumes diminishing returns but assumes one generic
technology is too simplistic and misses important differences between more successful and less successful
technologies.  Second, we use quantile regression techniques to learn more about patents that have
a high positive error term in our regressions – that is, patents that receive many more citations than
predicted based on observable characteristics.  We find that differences across technologies, rather
than differences across quantiles within technologies, are more important.  The value of successful
technologies persists longer than those of less successful technologies, providing evidence that success
is the culmination of several advances building upon one another, rather than resulting from one single
breakthrough.  Diminishing returns to research efforts appear most problematic during rapid increases
of research investment, such as experienced by solar energy in the 1970s.
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I. Introduction 
Technological change will play a key role in any attempt to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions that lead to climate change.  For example, European Union proposals to stabilize 
global average temperatures at two degrees Celsius over pre-Industrial Revolution levels imply 
stabilizing atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations at 450 parts per million (ppm).  
Current levels already exceed 380 ppm.  To meet such targets, annual CO2 emissions would need 
to peak at about 9 billion tons of carbon per year by about 2012, and fall to as little as 3.5 billion 
tons per year by 2100 (Clarke et al., 2007).  Meeting emission reduction targets such as these 
will not be possible without major changes in the way that energy is produced and consumed.  
Given the current status of alternative technologies, making such changes will be costly. 
Generation of electricity and heat is the largest source of carbon emissions, accounting for 41% 
of carbon emissions worldwide in 2006, followed by transportation at 23% (IEA 2008).  In both 
cases, alternative carbon-free energy sources such as wind, solar, or hydrogen fuels all are priced 
higher than traditional fossil fuels (IEA 2006).  However, technological improvements are likely 
to occur, leading to lower costs.  Much uncertainty surrounds the potential for technological 
change.  In its latest report on climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) summarizes estimates of the costs of stabilizing global carbon concentrations from a 
variety of climate models.  To stabilize concentrations at a level of 550 parts per million (ppm), 
the estimated costs, in terms of lost GDP in the year 2050, range from a four percent loss to a 
slight increase in GDP, relative to baseline growth (IPCC 2007).  Future technological change is 
an important driver of this uncertainty, and affects not only the cost of reducing emissions, but 
also predictions of what emissions levels will occur in the absence of climate policy initiatives.  
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Despite this uncertainty, most recent empirical studies and modeling estimates of the 
potential of technological change focus on the average returns to research and development 
(R&D), but contain little or no information about the distribution of returns to R&D, which is 
important for capturing the range of costs associated with climate change mitigation policies.  
The true nature of innovation and the R&D process is inherently uncertain and thus can be best 
described by a probability distribution (Mansfield, 1968; Evenson and Kislev, 1975).  More 
importantly, this probability distribution is highly skewed (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2002; Pakes, 
1986), suggesting that models focusing on average returns may severely underestimate the 
potential for significant innovations. Except for work by Baker (e.g., Baker and Solak, 2011; 
Baker and Adu-Bonnah, 2008), however, few studies in the climate policy literature have 
assumed that investment in R&D influences the level of uncertainty associated with the 
magnitude of the returns to R&D.  This is in part due to a lack of empirical support for 
calibrating R&D models based on anything other than average returns.  Due to the highly skewed 
returns to R&D, deterministic models based on average returns could underestimate the value of 
R&D investments as part of a strategy to avoid extreme climate impacts in the future.  Through 
an empirical study of patent citation data, this paper adds to the literature on returns to energy 
R&D by focusing on the behavior of the most successful innovations.  Moreover, we are 
interested in understanding whether this behavior differs across energy technologies.  The 
objective of this work is to provide an empirical basis for better modeling of the uncertain returns 
to energy R&D. 
Our paper builds on existing work using patent citations to study the returns to innovation 
(e.g., Popp 2002, 2006a, Caballero and Jaffe 1993).  A common finding in this literature is that 
research experiences diminishing returns – it gets more difficult to make additional advances as 
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technology improves.1   We make two contributions.  First, in contrast to Popp (2006a), we 
compare the results from analyzing an aggregate of six energy technologies to technology-by-
technology results.  Our results show that existing work that assumes diminishing returns for one 
generic technology is too simplistic and misses differences between more successful and less 
successful technologies.   
Second, given the importance of differences across technologies, is there any new 
information we can cull from looking at the most successful patents within each technology?  To 
measure the relative importance of differences across technologies versus the uncertainty of 
R&D, we apply quantile regression techniques to learn more about patents that have a high 
positive error term in our regressions – that is, patents that receive many more citations than 
predicted based on observable characteristics. It is these patents that are the high value patents in 
the distribution of possible outcomes.  While standard regression estimates give the change in the 
conditional mean of the dependent variable as we change a variable by one unit, quantile 
regression allows for an examination of inter-variable relationships at various parts of the 
conditional distribution by allowing estimates of the coefficients to vary based across quantiles 
of the distribution.  Using quantile techniques, we consider the following questions: 
• How does the likelihood of receiving a highly cited patent vary with research 
effort?2   
                                                 
1 Note that claims of diminishing returns to research within a field need not be inconsistent with the more general 
notion that there are increasing returns to research at the macroeconomic level. As new research makes the 
technologies in a given field obsolete, research efforts should switch to other, more productive areas. Such a general 
equilibrium analysis is beyond the scope of this research. 
2  Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) suggest that the expected value of research is independent of the amount of 
research spending by a firm.  That is, increased firm R&D expenditures do not increase the average value of a firm’s 
patents.  Our question is slightly different, as we focus on those patents in the upper tail of the value distribution, as 
these are the patents that move knowledge forward.  Because additional R&D projects increase the likelihood that 
any one research draw will be high valued, Lanjouw and Schankerman’s findings do not rule out the possibility that 
more R&D effort would increase the probability of observing a single high-valued invention.  See, for example, the 
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• Does it become harder to achieve a highly cited patent over time?  I.e., is the 
distribution of potential ideas replenished over time, or does success become more 
difficult as high-valued opportunities are depleted? 
• Do these results differ across energy technologies? 
We find that higher R&D spending does not necessarily lead to highly cited patents 
(“breakthroughs”).  We also find no evidence that highly cited patents or breakthroughs are more 
difficult to achieve over time.  Interestingly, we find that increases in subsequent patents lead to 
a proportionally higher increase in citations to earlier high quality patents, suggesting that these 
high quality patents may induce subsequent innovations.  Lastly, comparing the results from 
technology-by-technology regressions to those pooling our six energy technologies, we find that 
differences across quantiles only hold for select technologies and are smaller in magnitude than 
differences across technologies.  Thus, differences in technologies seem to be more important 
than R&D uncertainty in explaining patent behavior.   
 
II. Literature Review 
A survey of the recent climate policy and energy modeling literature shows that a decade 
after the work of researchers such as Goulder and Mathai (2000) and Goulder and Schneider 
(1999), the induced technical change climate policy and energy planning research community 
still has a long way to go in representing technology-by-technology variation and uncertain 
returns to R&D in its analyses.  Goulder and Mathai (2000) presented a new analytic framework 
for characterizing optimal carbon emissions abatement and carbon taxes under learning-by-
searching technical change.  In their simplified framework, they considered a single 
                                                                                                                                                             
model in Evenson and Kislev (1975).  However, if firms invest in the most promising research projects first, one 
would expect the probability of highly valued research to decrease as research effort increases. 
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representative emission abating technology affected by R&D investments.  Alternatively, 
Goulder and Schneider (1999) considered multiple technologies in their study of the impact of 
carbon policy on energy R&D investments, but they too made an important simplifying 
assumption (for the sake of focusing on their contribution) by assigning their technology groups 
the same parameter value for R&D program effectiveness.  Goulder and Schneider (1999) 
comment on their decision and perform key sensitivity analyses, citing the lack of available 
empirical data for doing otherwise.  Even today, the majority of researchers in the induced 
technical change climate policy and energy planning research community continue to make very 
similar assumptions about R&D-based technical change. 
Within a sampling of the last five to seven years of the numerical modeling literature, the 
same distinct categories of assumptions arise.  Bosetti et al. (2006) present WITCH, an optimal 
growth model that endogenously accounts for R&D-based technological learning.  However, 
while retaining the typical technological detail of bottom-up models, WITCH considers a single 
R&D-influenced technology category (advanced biofuels).  Later, Bosetti and Tavoni (2009) use 
a stochastic version of WITCH to determine optimal investment in an uncertain backstop 
technology R&D program under stringent carbon policies.  They, too, use a single representative 
carbon-free backstop.  Schwoon and Tol (2006) use a formulation of the Goulder and Mathai 
(2000) model to study the impact of socio-economic inertia in optimal carbon abatement in the 
presence of induced-technical change.  Their model consists of a single learning sector, and 
therefore one parameter value for the inertia and R&D learning parameters.  Moreover, in their 
future research discussion the authors point to the need to break the economy up into additional 
sectors, because they can have quite different inertias and parameters.  Finally, most recently 
Bye and Jacobsen (2011) use a numerical energy-climate CGE model to study how to divide 
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R&D investment dollars between general and emission-saving technologies under various carbon 
tax magnitudes.  However, in doing so, they use a single representative backstop technology 
(CCS) to differentiate between general R&D and emission saving R&D technology programs. 
During this time, other studies considered multiple technology categories, but used 
essentially the same values and assumptions about the process of innovation across them.  In 
their R&D investment analysis for general versus emission-saving technologies, Bye and 
Jacobsen (2011) also use identical functional forms and assumptions for decreasing returns to 
knowledge for the backstop and general technology R&D processes.  The authors comment on 
the general fact that different R&D industries must have important differences, but that they 
found no empirical research supporting using a different structure or parameter values.  Several 
other important economic models introduced and used within the last decade to study energy 
technology R&D investment and climate policies, either in the context of the entire energy sector 
or specific sectors such as electricity, also make similar assumptions.  Popp (2006b) uses the 
same parameters for the innovation possibilities frontier and diminishing returns to research in 
ENTICE-BR for both types of innovation processes included (energy efficiency and carbon-free 
backstop technology).  Miketa and Schrattenholzer (2004) use the same learning rate for both 
wind and solar technologies in determining the optimal allocation of R&D funds to the two 
electricity technologies using a learning-by-searching modified version of the MESSAGE 
electricity sub-model.  Finally, Otto et. al. (2008) study cost-effectiveness of climate policy 
under technology externalities, and use a CGE model to show that it is second-best optimal to 
subsidize emission intensive R&D when combined with a carbon pricing scheme.  However, for 
their two R&D-affected industries (a non-carbon intensive industry and a carbon-intensive 
industry), they assume that knowledge accumulates as a deterministic function of investment. 
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Even studies that allow for uncertain returns to research focus on average returns to R&D 
during calibration.  First, in determining the optimal R&D allocation between three different 
technologies (fossil, renewables, and CCS) in a climate-energy-economic model under 
uncertainty (MERGE), Blanford (2009) utilizes the same parameter values for the return on 
investment, diminishing returns, and limiting probability for the different technologies (although 
alternate values are tested across different model runs).  The behavior of all technologies in the 
analysis are therefore effectively treated the same.  Second, Baker and Adu-Bonnah (2008) 
consider two R&D-affected technology categories (alternative non-fossil and conventional 
fossil), use different structures to model technical change, and allow for differing probabilities 
for program riskiness to study the socially optimal level of R&D investment in the two 
technologies.  However, investment in R&D in the model results in one of only three outcomes: 
a deterministic “target” amount of technical change, total failure, or a “breakthrough.”  
Moreover, a one-to-one relationship between R&D investment dollars and the target amount of 
technical change is used for both technology groups, and sensitivity analyses are run on 
important innovation parameters such as the cost coefficient using a wide value range.   
In an effort to help close these research gaps, Baker et al. (2008, 2009a, 2009b) perform a 
comprehensive data collection using expert elicitations for how government funding 
differentially impacts the probability of success for three key alternative energy technologies: 
CCS, solar photovoltaic, and nuclear.  Their findings allow for technology-specific calibration of 
induced innovation and technical change in certain types of climate policy assessments, as shown 
in Baker and Solak (2011).  The current paper addresses another key gap in the empirical 
literature, also with an aim to support calibration in climate policy modeling.  Using the 
historical record on technology-specific knowledge flows as measured via patent data, we 
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examine the variation in the behavior of potential “breakthrough” innovations through time for a 
wide variety of technologies, focusing both on differences across technologies and between 
successful and unsuccessful patents within technology groups. 
 
III. Estimation Framework 
To envision the research process, consider a distribution representing the possible 
outcomes from a project.  We use forward patent citations as a measure of the value of these 
outcomes.  When a patent is granted, it contains citations to earlier patents that are related to the 
current invention.  The citations are placed in the patent after consultations among the applicant, 
his or her patent attorney, and the patent examiner. Citations received by a patent indicate that 
the knowledge represented in the patent was utilized in a subsequent invention.3 Because we are 
interested in the social value of invention, we prefer the use of citations as a measure of value 
over alternatives such as patent renewals and stock market returns, both of which focus primarily 
on the returns of innovation to the inventing firm.  Lanjouw & Schankerman (2004) compare 
numbers of claims, forward citations, backward citations, and patent family size, and find that 
forward citations are the most reliable measure of patent quality.  Moreover, Popp (2002) shows 
that (a) the likelihood of citation to patents for a given technology and year can be used to 
measure the quality of the knowledge stock on which future inventors build and (b) that 
increasing quality of the knowledge stock leads to more inventions in future years.  Popp (2006a) 
suggests that the likelihood of citation falls over time, suggesting that research success does 
become more difficult as knowledge progresses.  This paper also provides evidence that the 
                                                 
3 The key assumption here is that a citation made to a previous patent indicates a flow of knowledge from the cited 
patent to the citing patent, so that patents cited more frequently are considered more valuable to future inventors.  
Jaffe, Fogarty, and Banks (1998) investigate the validity of this assumption, using evidence from citations made to 
NASA patents. They conclude that, although there is noise in the citation process, aggregate citation patterns 
represent knowledge spillovers, although the spillover may be indirect. 
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expected number of citations per patent falls in years when many other patents are granted in the 
field, suggesting that there are also diminishing returns to research in any given time period.  
However, neither of these papers considers the uncertainty inherent in the research process, as 
they focus on average returns within a given year and constrain the results to be the same for all 
technologies.   
We build on this work by considering the entire distribution of research outcomes, 
focusing on the characteristics of high-value (e.g. highly cited) patents.  It is these high-value 
patents that will have the most impact on climate change.  Note, however, that a simple count of 
patent citations is not sufficient.  The number of subsequent citations received by a patent is a 
function of, among other things, the number of patents that are granted in subsequent years.  
More citations will be received by patents in active fields.  Thus, following the model in Popp 
(2006a), we estimate the predicted number of citations for each patent.  However, whereas Popp 
(2006a) only focused on mean values and assumed common parameter values across 
technologies, we (1) allow the results to vary across technologies and (2) use quantile regression 
to provide additional information on patents that are highly cited.  Defining citesi,j,s,t as the 
number of citations made to patent i in technology group j with grant year t, by patents with 
application year s, and NCTGj,s as the number of successful patent applications pertaining to 
technology j filed by U.S. inventors in year s, the predicted total number of citations to each 
patent/year pair are: 
tsjisji NCTG
sjtsji eeNCTGcites ,,,,,
)ln(
,,,,
ελ ++
==
ts,j,iXβ'   (1) 
NCTGj,s controls for the opportunities for citation available to each patent.  Because our 
observations are count data, we use negative binomial regression to estimate equation (1).   
Following Popp (2006a), the vector of explanatory variables, Xi,j,s,t, controls for features 
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of the citing and cited patent.  Most importantly, we include two tests for diminishing returns.  
First, we ask whether the likelihood of citation falls when more patents are granted within a 
specific technology group in the same year as the cited patent.  This variable, NCTDj,t, tests for 
diminishing returns to research within a given year, t.  A negative coefficient on this variable 
suggests that any individual patent will receive fewer citations, after controlling for each patent’s 
characteristics, if it is granted in a year with many other patents in the same technology.  
Diminishing returns here may imply that the additional research done in such years is of lower 
quality.  The assumption is that researchers choose the most fruitful projects first.  When the 
demand for energy R&D increases (for example, when energy prices are higher), marginal 
projects that weren’t viewed as profitable before now appear worthwhile.  Alternatively, it may 
be the case that there are fewer citations per patent because the patents overlap.  This suggests 
that the extra research done in years with many patents is of less social value, since the unique 
contribution of each patent is smaller. 
Second, we ask whether the probability of citation falls as the cumulative number of 
patents in a field increases.  Cumulative patents Kj,t, defined below, tests for diminishing returns 
across time.  Diminishing returns across time could occur if there is a limited pool of potential 
inventions in a given field.  As the technological frontier moves outward, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to create new inventions that exceed the current standard.  To test this, we create a stock 
of existing patents for each technology, using patent data from 1900-2007.  In any year t, the 
stock of existing patents is calculated as:   
 
=
+−−−−−=
t
l
ljtj ltltPATK
0
21,, )]}1(exp[1)]{(exp[ ββ  (1) 
In this equation, β1 represents a rate of decay, and β2 a rate of diffusion.  We choose a 
decay rate of 0.1 and a rate of diffusion of 0.25.  Such rates are commonly found in the literature 
11 
 
on technological change, and imply that a patent has its maximum effect on the stock about 4 
years after the patent was granted (see, for example, Griliches, 1995).  For each technology, the 
stocks are normalized so that the level of the stock in 1980 equals 100.  Thus, a one-unit change 
in the stock indicates a one percent increase in the knowledge stock for that technology. 
In addition to these controls for the returns to research over time, we also consider several 
variables that control for the characteristics of individual potentially cited patents.  In particular, 
to capture the level and direction of government-sponsored R&D, we include two variables to 
ascertain the effect of government research on the knowledge stock.  The first is a dummy 
variable set equal to 1 if the cited patent is assigned to the U.S. government.  This includes 
patents assigned to a government laboratory.  The second is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if 
the cited patent is a child of a U.S. government patent.  These are defined as patents that are not 
assigned to the U.S. government, but that cite at least one patent assigned to the U.S. 
government.4  In addition, we include controls for patent features such as the number of claims 
and the number of citations made by the patent.  The complete list of explanatory variables 
appears below: 
• NCTGj,s represents the total number of successful U.S. patent applications per 
citing year, s: This controls for opportunities for future citations.  Separate counts 
are made for each technology group, j. 
• NCTDj,t represents the total number of patents granted in the technology 
group in the same year, t, as the cited patent.  As noted, this controls for 
diminishing returns within a given year. 
                                                 
4 I label these patents as “children” so as to provide a short label for discussion.  It need not be the case, however, 
that child patents are direct descendants of government research, meaning that they need not result from work 
directly related to the government’s research efforts.  Citations may result simply because both patents are in similar 
areas, so that there is an indirect knowledge spillover, but no intentional technology transfer between the 
government and the private patent. 
12 
 
• Kj,t-1 is the lagged value of the stock of accumulated patents granted in 
technology j by year t, where year t represents the issue year of the cited patent.  
This controls for diminishing returns across time. 
• ASSIGNEEi is a set of dummy variables defining the patent assignee of the 
cited patent.  Potential assignee types are corporate, individual, government, 
university, other research institution, and child of a government patent.  For each 
type, we include separate dummy variables for U.S. and foreign assignees (e.g. 
there is a dummy variable for U.S. corporations and a second for foreign 
corporations).  U.S. corporations are the excluded category. 
• CLAIMSi represents the number of claims on each cited patent.  Other things 
equal, patents with more claims should be cited more frequently. 
• CITEMADEi is the number of citations made by the cited patent.  Patents may 
generate more subsequent citations simply because they are in more crowded 
areas.  The number of citations made by these patents controls for this. 
• CITELAGs,t is the difference between the citing patent’s application year, s, and 
the cited patent’s grant year, t.  This allows for declining probabilities of citation 
over time, as the cited patents gradually become obsolete.  To allow for non-linear 
effects, we also include CITELAG2s,t. 
• CITINGYRs is a vector of year dummies defined based on the application year of 
the citing patents.  1990 is the excluded year.  This captures any fixed effects in 
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citations common to a grant year.  Over time, the number of citations per patent 
have increased due to changes in citing behavior.5   
• TECHNOLOGYj is a vector of energy technology group dummies. About half of 
all patent citations are to patents in the same classification (Jaffe et al. 1993). 
However, the technology groups in this paper range from groups with one or two 
subclassifications to groups with patents from many different broad 
classifications. Technology groups with broad definitions are more likely to 
include subclasses that are not strongly related, which means that citations to 
other patents in the group are less likely in those groups.  The excluded group is 
nuclear power. 
We are particularly interested in patents that have a high positive error term from this 
regression – that is, patents that receive many more citations than predicted based on observable 
characteristics. It is these patents that are the high value patents in the distribution of possible 
outcomes.  Quantile regression techniques allow us to learn more about these patents.  While 
standard regression estimates give the change in the conditional mean of the dependent variable 
as we change a variable by one unit, quantile regression allows examination of inter-variable 
relationships at various parts of the conditional distribution by allowing estimates of the 
coefficients to vary across quantiles of the distribution.6  Using quantile regression, we can, for 
example, ask whether additional research effort (measured by the total number of patents in a 
field) increases the likelihood of highly valuable patents, and whether this likelihood varies over 
                                                 
5 Changes in citing behavior over time must be accounted for because of institutional changes at the patent office 
that make patents more likely to cite earlier patents than was previously true, even if all other factors are equal. In 
particular, two changes have played an important role. First, computerization of patent office records has made it 
easier for both patent examiners and inventors to locate other patents similar to the current invention. Second, 
increasing legal pressure has made it more important for examiners to be sure that all relevant patents are cited. 
6 Koenker and Hallock (2001) provide a review of quantile regression techniques.  
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time.  This last question addresses whether the distribution of potential ideas is replenished over 
time, or if success becomes more difficult as high-valued opportunities are depleted.  
In addition we also explore the potential sources of high-valued innovations, asking 
whether these highly cited patents come from particular institutions, and whether increased 
government R&D spending can affect the likelihood of discovering high-value inventions.  For 
example, Popp (2006a) finds that government patents are not more likely to be cited than other 
patents.  This result is surprising, as one expects government research to focus on more basic 
needs, which should be cited more frequently.  One possible explanation for this could be that 
government research projects are more risky.  If the government does research that private firms 
won’t do because of greater risk, government research could have a similar expected value to 
private research, while at the same time resulting in both more high-value innovations and low-
value innovations. Quantile regression allows us to identify such differences across high- and 
low-valued patents. 
 
IV. Data 
Our data include all patents for our selected technologies granted by the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) with priority dates ranging from 1971 to 2008.7  We focus on 
granted patents because, until 2000, only patents granted by the USPTO were made public.8  
This also ensures that all the patents in our sample have met a minimum quality threshold.  To 
identify patents, we use a combination of the International Patent Classification (IPC) codes on 
                                                 
7 To calculate the stocks described in section II, we use patents dating back to 1900.  However, the citation data 
needed for the remaining analysis is not available until patents granted in 1975, limiting the citation analysis to 
patents from the 1970s forward.  Note that, because we observe granted patents, patent counts in recent years are 
truncated, since the average patent takes 2-3 years to go through the examination process.  Year effects will account 
for this truncation bias. 
8 This is different from most countries, where patent applications are published 18 months after they are filed.  Even 
today, while most U.S. applications are published after 18 months, an inventor can request that the application not 
be published as long as the applicant agrees not to pursue patent protection in other countries. 
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the patent and keyword searches of the title and abstract.  The IPC classes and keyword searches 
used are listed in Appendix A.9  We include patents related to six technologies that either provide 
cleaner energy or reduce energy consumption: wind, solar, fuel cells, nuclear, hybrid autos, and 
energy efficiency.  We obtained the patent data using Delphion, a commercially-available 
database that allows searching and downloading of patent records from patent offices 
worldwide.10   
Patents are sorted by the priority year, which is the year in which the initial application 
pertaining to this patent was filed.  If a patent is granted, protection begins from the priority date.  
This date corresponds to when the inventive activity took place, as patent applications are 
usually filed early in the inventive process (see, e.g., Griliches, 1990).  Figure 1 shows the trends 
in each technology across time.  Invention in nuclear technologies was strong throughout the 
1970s until 1990, at which point patent counts begin to decline.  Patent counts in both solar and 
wind energy have two peaks – one during the 1970s energy crisis and a second in the 21st century 
as climate policy brings renewed interest to renewable energy.  Interestingly, the 1970s peak is 
larger for solar energy, whereas for wind the more recent peak is larger.  The trend for energy 
efficiency is similar to wind, although the 1970s peak is less notable.  Both fuel cells and hybrid 
vehicle patents remain relatively flat until 1990 and peak around the year 2000. 
The Delphion database includes rich descriptive data for each patent, including patent 
citations made by each patent and the number of claims.  Using this citation data, we are able to 
                                                 
9 The IPC system is used by patent offices around the world to classify patents based on their intended use.  We 
begin by using a combination of keyword and IPC class searches to identify patent classes that both include relevant 
patents and that do not also include irrelevant patents.  We prefer to omit classes that contain a mix of relevant and 
irrelevant patents.  While this may cause us to omit some relevant patents, this is preferred to including irrelevant 
patents that would simply add noise to our data without adding additional information.  For most technologies, this 
resulted in a set of IPC classes that were used to identify relevant technologies.  In the case of energy efficiency, we 
could not identify relevant classes, as these patents are spread throughout various end use technologies.  Thus, we 
instead use a keyword search to identify these patents.   
10 http://www.delphion.com.  
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obtain forward citations received by each of our energy patents by other patents within the same 
technology field.  Table 1 and Figure 2 provide descriptive statistics on forward citations 
received by patents in each of our technology groups.  Note that the distribution of citations is 
highly skewed.  Many patents are never cited.  For every technology, the 25th percentile of 
citations received is 0.  The median for the aggregate of all technologies is just one citation 
received. Across technologies, the median ranges from 0 for efficiency patents to 3 for wind 
patents.  Even at the 75th percentile, forward citations received range from 1 for energy 
efficiency to 7 for wind.  However, there is a long tail with a select group of highly cited patents, 
as the maximum number of citations received ranges from 47 in nuclear energy to 210 for energy 
efficiency and for hybrid vehicle technologies.   
The three panels of Figure 2 provide a visual representation of three typical distributions 
of patent citations.  Each shows, on the y-axis, the number of patents from a given year and 
technology that receive a specific number of forward citations.  Panel A represents citations 
received by a successful technology, hybrid vehicles.  Here we see the distribution of citations 
received by hybrid vehicle patents from 1991.  Note that while over half of the 80 patents from 
this year receive five citations or less, there is a very long tail, including one patent that receives 
76 citations.  The pattern of another successful technology, wind energy patents from 1981, is 
similar, as shown in panel B.  Of particular note here is that, compared to the two other panels, 
most of these patents receive at least one citation.  Only 4 of 76 wind patents from that year 
receive no citations.  Most patents receive a few citations, but the tail is noticeably shorter than 
for hybrid vehicles.  Finally, panel C shows citations received by solar energy patents in 1981.  
Compared to hybrid vehicles and wind energy, solar energy has received less commercial 
success.  The patent citations received are consistent with these patents having lower social 
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value.  Of the 337 solar energy patents from 1981, 193 receive two or fewer citations.  Moreover, 
while the distribution is still skewed, there are no large outliers, unlike the hybrid vehicle case. 
Table 2 provides descriptive data by technology for other patent characteristics.  The 
number of claims per patent is relatively stable, with the average ranging from 11.5 for nuclear to 
17.0 for fuel cells.  The number of cited references to earlier patents ranges from 7.7 for nuclear 
to 12.3 for efficiency.  In both cases, these data suggest that nuclear energy patents are narrower 
in scope than their counterparts in fields such as fuel cells or energy efficiency.  Interestingly, 
while the greater breadth of fuel cell patents also results in a high average number of future 
citations received, that is not the case for energy efficiency patents.  Finally, note that the size of 
each technology group does vary, as there are only 47.5 wind patents per year on average, 
compared to 469.5 energy efficiency patents per year.  Nonetheless, wind patents are very likely 
to receive citations from future wind patents, whereas energy efficiency patents are less likely 
than our other technologies to receive a future citation from a patent within the same group.  This 
suggests that it is not just the size of each group that matters, but the quality of the innovations 
that influence future usefulness. 
To consider whether patents from some institutions are more valuable than others, we use 
data from the NBER patent database to identify the type of assignee for each patent (e.g., 
corporate, individual, government, university, other research institution, and child of a 
government patent, as well as foreign or domestic).11  Table 3 shows the percentage of patents 
from various assignees.  The first rows show these data for the overall sample, followed by 
percentages for selected single years.  Overall, nuclear and solar are most likely to have patents 
                                                 
11 We used an updated version of the NBER database that includes data on assignees for all patents granted through 
2006, available at https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home.  For patents from 2007 onward, we matched 
assignee characteristics with patents from the same assignee from earlier years when possible and then manually 
coded patents for which the assignee did not appear in the NBER database. 
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assigned to government.  Except for hybrid vehicles, about 40% of patents come from foreign 
inventors.  Largely due to innovation from Japanese auto manufacturers, over two-thirds of 
hybrid vehicle patents granted in the U.S. go to foreign inventors.  Looking across time, 
government patents were more prevalent in the 1970s and 1980s, and the share of foreign patents 
is growing for every technology.   
Finally, the right-hand columns of Table 3 show the average number of citations received 
by patents with different assignees.  Except for wind, children of government patents receive the 
most citations.  There is variation in the quality of government patents across technologies.  
Government wind patents receive, on average, more citations than any other type of wind patent.  
However, just 1.44% of wind patents are assigned to the government.  Government patents also 
receive more citations than the average patent for fuel cells and solar energy.  For the remaining 
technologies, government patents receive fewer citations than average.  In all cases, foreign 
patents receive fewer citations. 
 
V. Estimation 
Because most patents are never cited, we use count data regression techniques.  For the 
quantile regressions, we use a method suggested by Machado and Santos Silva (2005) and 
developed for Stata by Miranda (2006, 2008).12  To overcome the problem of having a discrete 
dependent variable when doing the quantile regression, this method smooths the data by adding a 
uniform random variable to each dependent variable.  With appropriate assumptions (discussed 
in Machado and Santos Silva 2005), standard quantile regression techniques can be applied to a 
monotonic transformation of this smoothed variable. Because the “jitters” to the data are 
                                                 
12 QCOUNT, the Stata software for quantile regressions using count data is available from 
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456714.html.  
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randomly added, 100 draws of the random variable u are taken and an average of the jittered 
sample is created. 
Our regressions include patents granted in the U.S. for six technologies (wind, solar, fuel 
cells, nuclear, hybrid autos, and energy efficiency).  We consider cited patents with initial 
priority dates from 1971 to 2004, and citing patents with priority dates ranging from 1972 to 
2008.   
Table 4 presents regression results pooling all technologies.  Except for the coefficient for 
ln(# of citing patents), results are shown as incidence rate ratios, eβ.  Moreover, to aid 
interpretation and make comparisons across technologies, the number of patents, the number of 
claims, and the number of citations made by each patent are normalized so that a one-unit change 
equals a ten percent deviation from the mean.13  For example, an incidence rate ratio of 1.2 
implies that a ten percent deviation from the mean for that variable results in 20 percent more 
citations to the patent.  The first four columns present the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th quantiles, and 
the final column presents the results from a standard generalized negative binomial regression.  
Our primary focus is on the behavior of patents in the higher quantiles.  Indeed, descriptive data 
suggest that the mean number of citations falls near the 75th quantile for most technologies, as 
most patents are never cited.  The interpretation for each quantile is that these represent patents 
with unobserved characteristics in quantile x.  Intuitively, this can be thought of as the 
unobserved quality of each patent, so that patents in higher quantiles have higher unobserved 
quality. 
Note that ln(# of citing patents) controls for the number of opportunities for a patent to be 
cited.  In a standard count model, this coefficient should equal 1.  Indeed, it is not significantly 
                                                 
13 The normalization first divides each continuous variable by its mean, multiplies by 10, and then takes deviations 
from the mean by subtracting 10.  This procedure is introduced in Kerr and Newell (2003), and results in normalized 
variables that have a mean of 0.   
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different from 1 in column 5.  Interestingly, its value grows in the quantile models, with a value 
of 1.493 for the 90th quantile, indicating that increases in subsequent patents more than 
proportionally increase citations to high quality patents.  This suggests that high quality patents 
may be the cause of these subsequent patents – that is, the value of high quality knowledge leads 
to additional patents in subsequent years.  Also interesting is that the cite lag, or the time that 
passes between the cited and citing patents, is twice as short for high quality patents, suggesting 
that the value of these patents is revealed quickly.  While statistically significant due to the large 
number of observations, the squared term for the cite lag has almost no meaningful effect, with a 
value of 0.999 or 1.0 in all cases. 
The accumulated stock of past patents (“stock of patents”) and the number of patents 
granted in the same year as the cited patent (“# of patents in cited year”) are important for 
calibration of climate models, as they control for potential diminishing returns to innovation.  
The only evidence for diminishing returns is in a given year, as suggested by the significant 
value of 0.962 associated with “# of patents in cited year” in the last column.  Thus, as more 
patent applications are filed in a given year, the probability of any one patent receiving a citation 
falls (by 3.8% for a 10% increase in patent applications). This effect is twice as large for the 
highest quality patents (i.e., a 10% increase in the number of patents in the cited year reduces the 
probability of citation by 6.2% in the 90th quantile, compared to just 3.3% in the 25th quantile), 
suggesting that additional research effort is applied to marginal projects with less potential value.  
Thus, the pooled regression results suggest that large increases in research spending do not 
necessarily make it easier to obtain breakthrough results, as the most promising projects are 
pursued first. 
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Finally, we control for several possible patent assignee characteristics.  While the effect 
of most characteristics is similar across quantiles, we do find that patents assigned to government 
agencies are less likely to receive citations in the highest quality quantile.  Moreover, as in Popp 
(2006a), children of government patents are the most valuable.  This suggests that the value of 
government research is enhanced once acted upon by the private sector.  Moreover, while the 
differences are small, nearly all assignee effects are smallest in the 90th quantile.  Since corporate 
patents are the excluded category, this suggests that those patents are most likely to result in high 
value outcomes. 
While we find some differences across quantiles, the results in Table 4 constrain the 
effects to be the same across all technologies.  However, our data include a range of 
technologies.  Some, such as wind and hybrid vehicles, have moved from experimental 
technologies to (at least limited) commercial success.  Solar, in contrast, remains a high-cost 
niche technology.  Others, such as energy efficiency and nuclear, have been mature for some 
time.  Therefore, we also estimate separate regressions for each individual technology.14  Table 5 
presents results for the generalized negative binomial regression by technology.  This suggests 
that there are important differences across technologies.  Of particular note is the effect of the 
cite lag variable.  Using coefficient estimates for citelag and citelag2 from the individual 
technology regressions, Figure 3 shows how the probability of citation changes after x years. As 
shown in panel A of Figure 3, the probability of citation trends downward monotonically over 
time for most technologies.  However, for wind and hybrid vehicles, the probability of citation 
initially increases, peaking after six years for wind and three years for hybrids.  Indeed, the 
combined effect of the cite lag variables for wind does not become negative until year 12.  As 
                                                 
14 We drop the variable NCTGt from these regressions, as it is perfectly collinear with the individual year dummies 
for citing patents. 
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these two technologies are the most successful of our six energy technologies, this suggests that 
the value of patents last longer for successful technologies. For instance, evidence from a history 
of wind technology innovation (Dykes, 2010a; Dykes, 2010b) demonstrates that success in wind 
is cumulative.  There is not a single breakthrough invention, but rather a series of successful 
innovations that build on the last major improvement.  At each step, innovations such as variable 
speed, improved power electronics, better materials for rotors, and the ability to “feather” rotors 
required success of the previous innovation. The persistent value of wind patents over time is 
consistent with such behavior. 
Regarding diminishing returns, once again the only meaningful evidence is found within 
a given year.  Wind, solar, and fuel cells all experience diminishing returns within a given year, 
as suggested by the significant <1 coefficient associated with “# of patents in cited year” in Table 
5.  A ten percent increase in patents in the cited year reduces the probability of receiving a 
citation by 2.6% for wind, 4.3% for solar and 2.1% for fuel cells.  In contrast, both hybrids and 
energy efficiency show evidence of positive spillovers within a given year, as the probability of 
citation increases for patents from years with higher patenting activity.  There are few noticeable 
differences for assignee types across technologies, except that the low value of U.S. government 
patents found in the pooled regression appears to be almost entirely a result of nuclear energy 
patents, as this is the only technology for which this coefficient is significant.   
To help reconcile the differences regarding diminishing returns across different 
technologies, Table 6 includes the results of an additional regression adding a squared term for 
the number of patents in the cited year.15  To be able to interpret the squared term, we do not 
normalize the data in this regression, and thus only use this approach for single technology 
                                                 
15 Results for other coefficients remain the same and are not reported. 
23 
 
regressions.16  As shown in Table 6, diminishing returns are an issue for all technologies when 
the level of innovation is high enough, as the squared term is negative for all technologies in 
which the linear term is not negative.  This holds true for wind, nuclear, and hybrid vehicles.  
Moreover, for all three of these technologies, the turning point at which increased patenting leads 
to diminishing returns occurs at reasonable values, either slightly above or slightly below the 
average number of patents per year for these technologies.  Figure 4 shows the patent counts for 
each technology, with years affected by diminishing returns represented by dashed lines.  These 
dashed lines represent years where the number of patents is above the turning point calculated in 
Table 6.  In each case, it is the years of peak patenting activity that experience diminishing 
returns within a given year. 
The other notable change in Table 6 is that the coefficient on cite lag increases for hybrid 
patents.  As a result, while hybrid and wind patents are still the only two technologies for which 
the probability of citation does not decay immediately, it is now hybrid patents that see the 
probability of citation increase more strongly over time.  This is shown in panel B of Figure 3, 
where the combined effect of the cite lag variables for hybrid patents does not become negative 
until year 19.  As we will show below, this result is driven by the most successful hybrid patents. 
Tables 7 and 8 present the quantile results for each technology.  Table 7 includes patent 
characteristics (including our tests for diminishing returns) and Table 8 includes assignee 
characteristics.  Comparisons across technologies can be seen by reading across, and 
comparisons across quantiles for a given technology can be seen by reading downward.  What is 
notable here is that the differences across quantiles found in the pooled regression only hold up 
in select technologies and are generally of a smaller magnitude.  The most notable difference is 
that the cite lag for hybrids only increases the probability of citation in the 90th quantile, 
                                                 
16 However, we do divide the number of patents by 10 to obtain reasonable magnitudes on the coefficients. 
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suggesting that the result found for hybrids in Table 6 is driven by the highest quality patents.  
Similarly, for three less successful technologies – solar, fuel cells, and nuclear – patents in the 
90th percentile decay more quickly.  However, it is clear that the major differences are driven by 
technology, rather than by quantiles.  For example, for the three technologies in which the effect 
of number of patents in the cited year is positive, the coefficient is positive across all quantiles.  
Moreover, for each of these three technologies, the turning point of the net effect of number of 
patents in the cited year is similar across all quantiles.  The largest spread is for hybrids, where 
the turning point ranges from 271.9 patents in the 50th quantile to 302.9 patents in the 90th 
quantile.  Thus, it is not that more valuable wind patents behave differently than less valuable 
wind technologies, but rather that patents from successful technologies such as wind and hybrids 
behave differently than other technologies. 
 
VI. Discussion 
Reducing carbon emissions will require a diverse set of energy technologies. As the costs 
of many alternative technologies are high, innovation will play an important role in efforts to 
reduce carbon emissions.  While climate models are beginning to reflect the diverse nature of the 
technologies required to reduce emissions, efforts to calibrate R&D-driven innovation on these 
technologies lag behind.  Most empirical papers on energy innovation pool technologies 
together, and to our knowledge, all existing work focuses on the average returns to innovation on 
alternative energy technologies.  By estimating separate equations for each technology and using 
quantile regression techniques to focus on the characteristics of high-value energy patents, we 
are able to determine whether R&D uncertainty or differences in technologies matter most for 
patent success. 
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By testing for the impact of patent characteristics on patent value by technology, we find 
that there are differences between successful and less successful technologies.  In particular, the 
value of successful technologies persists longer than those of less successful technologies, 
providing evidence that success is the culmination of several advances building upon one 
another, rather than resulting from one big hit.  Our evidence on diminishing returns suggests 
that diminishing returns within a given year are an issue when inventive activity is particularly 
high.  However, at low levels of activity, some technologies, such as hybrid vehicles, experience 
increasing returns, suggesting benefits to positive spillovers are possible with just moderate 
levels of research investment. 
By using quantile regression techniques, we explore whether high value patents have 
different observable characteristics than other patents.  When pooled across technologies, we do 
find evidence that the magnitude of diminishing returns within a given year is larger for the most 
successful innovations.  However, using quantile regressions for individual technologies, this 
result only holds for solar energy.  While this may suggest that solar energy innovation was hurt 
by moving too quickly in the 1970s, the biggest takeaway point from this research is that it is 
differences across technologies, rather than among high and low impact innovations within a 
technology, that are most important.   
Our results suggest that allowing for different behavior across technologies is important 
when modeling R&D-based innovation in climate models, and we provide empirical evidence 
for such calibration.  In particular, it would be useful to classify technologies based on their 
likelihood of success, with knowledge based on technologies perceived to be successful decaying 
more slowly.  Such technologies are also likely to have slow, steady improvement over time, 
rather than large discrete jumps in knowledge.  The results on diminishing returns by quantiles 
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and technology suggest that diminishing returns will be most problematic during rapid increases 
of research investment, such as experienced by solar energy in the 1970s, but that it need not be 
universal.  Finally, that decay rates fall monotonically for less successful technologies suggests 
that data patent citations received just a few years after a patent’s initial filing data could provide 
researchers and policymakers information on the research avenues most likely to be successful.   
Our results also provide qualitative insights for policy.  Diminishing returns within a 
given year but not necessarily over time, as in the wind and hybrid cases, suggest that long-term 
sustained incentives to innovate may be more effective than short bursts of support.  Moving 
advanced technologies to large-scale commercial deployment will likely require a sequence of 
innovations over a number of years.  This sequence suggests that research prizes, which offer 
large rewards for a single technological breakthrough, will be less effective, as they do not 
provide incentives for the series of incremental gains needed to make successful energy 
technologies possible.  The differences between technologies also supports economic theory, 
which would indicate that technology neutral policy instruments be used where possible.  In the 
1970s it would have been difficult to predict that wind and hybrid technologies would evolve 
differently from solar and fuel cells.  Technology-specific support can lead to spending on low-
value innovations, as in the case of federal support for nuclear.  Finally, as suggested above, 
some evidence of which technologies are higher-value can sometimes be apparent after several 
years, and policies that can adjust to new information will lead to more efficient outcomes. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive data: number of citations per patent, 1971-2008 
    
No. of 
Citations       
No. of 
Citations       
No. of 
Citations 
                      
Efficiency Mean 1.212   Hybrid Mean 4.928   Solar Mean 3.830 
  SD 4.473     SD 10.219     SD 5.761 
  Max 210     Max 210     Max 69 
  Min 0     Min 0     Min 0 
  5_percentile 0     5_percentile 0     5_percentile 0 
  25_percentile 0     25_percentile 0     25_percentile 0 
  50_percentile 0     50_percentile 1     50_percentile 2 
  75_percentile 1     75_percentile 5     75_percentile 5 
  95_percentile 5     95_percentile 22     95_percentile 15 
  99_percentile 15     99_percentile 46     99_percentile 29 
                      
Fuel Cells Mean 5.378   Nuclear Mean 3.187   Wind Mean 4.912 
  SD 10.325     SD 4.367     SD 6.492 
  Max 119     Max 47     Max 62 
  Min 0     Min 0     Min 0 
  5_percentile 0     5_percentile 0     5_percentile 0 
  25_percentile 0     25_percentile 0     25_percentile 0 
  50_percentile 1     50_percentile 2     50_percentile 3 
  75_percentile 6     75_percentile 4     75_percentile 7 
  95_percentile 25     95_percentile 12     95_percentile 18 
  99_percentile 49     99_percentile 20     99_percentile 31 
                      
Total Mean 2.967                 
  SD 6.673                 
  Max 210                 
  Min 0                 
  5_percentile 0                 
  25_percentile 0                 
  50_percentile 1                 
  75_percentile 3                 
  95_percentile 14                 
  99_percentile 31                 
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Table 2 – Other descriptive data, 1971-2008 
    Citations Claims 
Cited 
References 
Patents Per 
Year 
            
Efficiency Mean 1.212 15.731 12.322 469.510 
  SD 4.473 13.672 21.037 424.155 
  Max 210 318 641 1421 
  Min 0 1 0 1 
            
Fuel Cells Mean 5.378 16.957 11.481 172.020 
  SD 10.325 14.661 19.337 233.436 
  Max 119 300 479 912 
  Min 0 0 0 2 
            
Hybrid Mean 4.928 14.371 11.501 81.596 
  SD 10.219 11.937 18.050 109.167 
  Max 210 167 395 379 
  Min 0 1 0 1 
            
Nuclear Mean 3.187 11.536 7.702 176.542 
  SD 4.367 10.531 8.615 119.899 
  Max 47 499 201 330 
  Min 0 0 0 1 
            
Solar Mean 3.830 14.135 8.118 151.365 
  SD 5.761 13.030 8.707 150.767 
  Max 69 236 140 542 
  Min 0 0 0 1 
            
Wind Mean 4.912 14.067 11.483 47.523 
  SD 6.492 11.558 15.426 38.885 
  Max 62 138 327 145 
  Min 0 1 0 1 
            
Total Mean 2.967 14.823 10.711 134.689 
  SD 6.673 13.182 17.437 227.498 
  Max 210 499 641 1421 
  Min 0 0 0 1 
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Table 3 – Descriptive data: granted patents and citations by assignee 
  
  
 % of granted patents by assignee  
   
Average number of cites received by assignee 
 
  N 
% 
private % gov 
% other 
public 
% 
foreign 
% gov 
child   
average 
cites Private Government 
Other 
Public Foreign Child 
                            
Entire Sample                          
Efficiency 23005 96.03 1.05 2.91 42.97 0.76   1.21 1.22 0.76 1.26 1.15 7.25 
Fuel Cells 8429 89.54 2.64 7.88 49.63 16.41   5.38 5.24 8.82 5.71 4.29 9.32 
Hybrid 3835 95.56 0.54 3.84 67.57 3.68   4.93 5.03 4.10 2.61 4.76 12.24 
Nuclear 10416 84.65 12.09 3.31 46.47 28.82   3.19 3.28 2.96 1.58 2.58 3.76 
Solar 7871 92.12 3.84 3.97 39.82 15.48   3.19 3.81 4.63 3.49 2.42 4.81 
Wind 2091 96.04 1.44 2.67 41.47 9.20   4.91 4.87 7.21 4.83 3.12 5.25 
                            
1971                           
Efficiency 66 98.48 0.00 1.52 34.85 0.00   1.08 1.06 0.00 2.00 0.48 0.00 
Fuel Cells 32 88.00 10.00 2.00 34.00 0.00   6.16 6.52 3.60 3.00 7.94 0.00 
Hybrid 30 100.00 0.00 0.00 43.33 3.33   5.70 5.70 0.00 0.00 6.92 0.00 
Nuclear 12 67.44 27.91 4.65 43.41 16.28   5.05 5.83 3.50 3.00 3.81 4.76 
Solar 27 75.00 25.00 0.00 37.50 25.00   8.63 6.25 15.75 0.00 13.33 9.50 
Wind 72 100.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 0.00   10.33 10.33 0.00 0.00 5.00 0.00 
                            
1981                           
Efficiency 558 96.95 1.25 1.79 36.02 0.18   1.12 1.14 1.00 0.20 1.18 0.00 
Fuel Cells 73 76.00 9.33 14.67 22.67 13.33   9.75 9.77 8.43 10.45 9.06 9.44 
Hybrid 22 96.15 3.85 0.00 26.92 3.85   5.46 5.24 11.00 0.00 1.86 8.00 
Nuclear 247 80.59 18.32 1.10 58.24 37.00   3.84 4.00 2.92 7.00 3.00 4.01 
Solar 542 93.18 5.04 2.08 33.23 14.84   3.03 2.97 3.18 5.57 2.35 3.39 
Wind 36 96.05 0.00 3.95 30.26 5.26   5.93 6.11 0.00 1.67 2.87 9.00 
                            
 
(continued on next page)
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 % of granted patents by assignee  
   
Average number of cites received by assignee 
 
  N 
% 
private % gov 
% other 
public 
% 
foreign 
% gov 
child   
average 
cites Private Government 
Other 
Public Foreign 
Child of 
government 
patent 
1991              
Efficiency 567 93.47 2.12 4.41 42.33 0.71   1.63 1.63 0.17 2.36 2.09 38.67 
Fuel Cells 150 89.06 5.47 5.47 55.47 37.50   15.21 14.33 15.71 29.00 15.49 23.74 
Hybrid 130 97.50 0.00 2.50 71.25 8.75   9.06 8.86 0.00 17.00 9.33 19.00 
Nuclear 241 92.53 6.17 1.30 44.81 30.19   2.63 2.71 1.79 1.25 1.90 2.63 
Solar 130 90.50 5.03 4.47 49.72 16.20   3.13 3.24 1.67 2.50 2.60 3.67 
Wind 30 100.00 0.00 0.00 34.38 12.50   9.53 9.53 0.00 0.00 4.27 13.25 
                            
2001                           
Efficiency 1360 95.59 0.81 3.90 47.21 1.10   0.65 0.65 0.27 0.79 0.42 1.33 
Fuel Cells 904 94.30 0.99 4.82 58.99 11.29   0.95 0.94 1.78 0.98 0.65 1.34 
Hybrid 346 97.31 0.00 2.69 73.12 1.61   1.74 1.76 0.00 0.80 1.44 1.00 
Nuclear 310 76.97 2.81 20.79 61.24 17.98   0.29 0.21 0.00 0.62 0.16 0.17 
Solar 222 93.58 1.89 4.53 52.08 15.47   0.65 0.69 0.00 0.08 0.41 0.89 
Wind 64 96.55 0.69 2.76 64.14 11.72   1.49 1.48 3.00 1.50 0.95 1.56 
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Table 4 – Pooled Technology Results 
Pooled q25 q 50 q75 q90 
 
gnbreg 
ln(# of citing patents) 0.907*** 0.914*** 1.147*** 1.493*** 
 
0.998*** 
 
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) 
 
(0.034) 
Cite lag 0.974*** 0.976*** 0.969*** 0.914*** 
 
0.964*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) 
Cite lag^2 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 1.000 
 
0.999*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Stock of patents 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.998*** 0.999*** 
 
0.999*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
# of patents in cited yr. 0.967*** 0.967*** 0.968*** 0.938*** 
 
0.962*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
# of claims made 1.008*** 1.010*** 1.013*** 1.018*** 
 
1.012*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
# of cited references 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.996*** 0.997*** 
 
0.997*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.001) 
Foreign corporation 
assignee 0.759*** 0.757*** 0.717*** 0.683*** 
 
0.722*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) 
 
(0.014) 
US individual assignee 0.867*** 0.866*** 0.862*** 0.822*** 
 
0.829*** 
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) 
 
(0.022) 
Foreign individual assignee 0.570*** 0.573*** 0.519*** 0.463*** 
 
0.534*** 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
 
(0.021) 
US government assignee 0.852*** 0.852*** 0.810*** 0.726*** 
 
0.799*** 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) 
 
(0.041) 
Foreign government 
assignee 0.708*** 0.717*** 0.688*** 0.619*** 
 
0.693*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.026) 
 
(0.037) 
US university assignee 0.863*** 0.860*** 0.895** 0.845*** 
 
0.903* 
 
(0.032) (0.031) (0.037) (0.038) 
 
(0.056) 
Foreign university assignee 0.451 0.492*** 0.451*** 0.426*** 
 
0.564*** 
 
(0.392) (0.047) (0.048) (0.063) 
 
(0.100) 
US institution assignee 0.852*** 0.848*** 0.838*** 0.766*** 
 
0.812** 
 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) 
 
(0.069) 
Foreign institution assignee 0.524*** 0.557*** 0.511*** 0.452*** 
 
0.538*** 
 
(0.032) (0.027) (0.028) (0.032) 
 
(0.044) 
Child of US govt. patent 1.392*** 1.413*** 1.450*** 1.372*** 
 
1.279*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.027) 
 
(0.032) 
Child of Foreign govt patent 1.274*** 1.270*** 1.337*** 1.410*** 
 
1.267*** 
  (0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.033) 
 
(0.035) 
Number of obs. 831678 831678 831678 831678 
 
831678 
Predicted quantile 0.26242 0.52377 0.78349 0.95075 
  log likelihood 
     
-303570.7 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Except for the coefficient for ln(# of citing patents), results are shown as incidence rate ratios, 
e(beta).  Moreover, to aid interpretation and make comparisons across technologies, the number of 
patents, the number of claims, and the number of citations made by each patent are normalized so 
that a one-unit change equals a ten percent deviation from the mean (Kerr and Newell, 2003). 
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Table 5 – Generalized Negative Binomial Results by Technology 
 
wind solar fuelcell nuclear hybrid eff overall 
ln(# of citing patents) 
      
0.998*** 
       
(0.034) 
Cite lag 1.017* 0.975*** 0.940*** 0.984* 1.018 0.926*** 0.964*** 
 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.015) (0.003) 
Cite lag^2 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.997*** 1.000 0.999*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock of patents 0.996*** 0.997*** 0.994*** 1.000 0.998*** 0.997*** 0.999*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
# of patents in cited yr. 0.974*** 0.957*** 0.979*** 0.986 1.027** 1.035*** 0.962*** 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.002) 
# of claims made 1.016*** 1.011*** 1.015*** 1.009*** 1.016*** 1.012*** 1.012*** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) 
# of cited references 1.000 0.991*** 0.993*** 1.000 1.002 1.001 0.997*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Foreign corporation assignee 0.584*** 0.708*** 0.654*** 0.635*** 1.112 0.914* 0.722*** 
 
(0.056) (0.032) (0.027) (0.020) (0.084) (0.043) (0.014) 
US individual assignee 0.790*** 0.800*** 0.592*** 0.763*** 1.054 1.183*** 0.829*** 
 
(0.058) (0.029) (0.061) (0.067) (0.152) (0.077) (0.022) 
Foreign individual assignee 0.636*** 0.543*** 0.446*** 0.493*** 0.617** 0.622*** 0.534*** 
 
(0.056) (0.032) (0.080) (0.060) (0.130) (0.054) (0.021) 
US government assignee 1.176 1.077 1.030 0.528*** 1.244 0.646 0.799*** 
 
(0.209) (0.114) (0.123) (0.030) (0.501) (0.215) (0.041) 
Foreign government assignee 0.804 0.733*** 0.567** 0.642*** 0.931 0.636* 0.693*** 
 
(0.221) (0.076) (0.143) (0.039) (0.358) (0.168) (0.037) 
US university assignee 0.526** 0.926 0.904 0.543*** 1.367 1.072 0.903* 
 
(0.168) (0.094) (0.084) (0.112) (0.420) (0.197) (0.056) 
Foreign university assignee 0.793 0.754 0.462** 0.203*** 0.000*** 0.267* 0.564*** 
 
(0.255) (0.179) (0.149) (0.067) (0.000) (0.188) (0.100) 
US institution assignee 0.765 0.919 0.744*** 0.557*** 1.002 0.838 0.812** 
 
(0.221) (0.266) (0.079) (0.096) (0.372) (0.167) (0.069) 
Foreign institution assignee 0.345** 0.420*** 0.494*** 0.577*** 0.680 1.080 0.538*** 
 
(0.153) (0.082) (0.059) (0.077) (0.277) (0.253) (0.044) 
Child of US govt. patent 1.285*** 1.395*** 1.447*** 1.028 1.356** 2.454*** 1.279*** 
 
(0.119) (0.073) (0.064) (0.040) (0.200) (0.553) (0.032) 
Child of Foreign govt. patent 1.622*** 1.397*** 1.595*** 1.202*** 1.232 0.791 1.267*** 
  (0.200) (0.075) (0.131) (0.044) (0.255) (0.169) (0.035) 
Number of obs. 31981 160773 86196 179506 39684 333538 831678 
log likelihood -20032.1 -64944.1 -59450.9 -69914.5 -24580.2 -61275.2 -303570.7 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; All e(beta) except ln_nctg 
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Table 6 – Impact of High Patenting Activity 
 
 
wind solar fuel cells nuclear hybrid efficiency 
ln(# of citing patents) 
      
       Cite lag 1.009 0.975*** 0.941*** 0.970*** 1.061*** 0.917*** 
 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.019) 
Cite lag^2 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.997*** 1.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock of patents 0.996*** 0.997*** 0.994*** 0.996 0.999* 0.997*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) 
# of patents in cited yr. X10 1.045 0.984*** 0.994 1.153*** 1.082*** 1.002 
 
(0.038) (0.006) (0.005) (0.060) (0.019) (0.005) 
(# of patents in cited yr. X10)^2 0.994** 1.000 1.000 0.997*** 0.999*** 1.000 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of claims made 1.013*** 1.009*** 1.009*** 1.009*** 1.012*** 1.008*** 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
# of cited references 1.001 0.988*** 0.992*** 0.999 1.002 1.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Turning point for nCTD effect 36.6 
  
260.5 268.1 
 Average patents/year 55.8 208.4 212.7 232.8 101.1 617.5 
Number of obs. 31981 160773 86196 179506 39684 333538 
log likelihood -20022.82 -64943.38 -59450.88 -69904.75 -24543.49 -61274.15 
NOTES: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; All e(beta) except ln_nctg 
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Table 7 – Patent Characteristic Quantile Results by Technology 
90th quantile wind solar fuel cells nuclear hybrid efficiency 
Cite lag 1.005 0.921*** 0.899*** 0.904*** 1.068*** 0.884*** 
 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.020) (0.008) 
Cite lag^2 0.999** 0.999 0.999** 0.999* 0.996*** 1.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Stock of patents 0.996*** 0.998*** 0.990*** 0.990** 0.999*** 0.994*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) 
# of patents in cited yr. 1.083** 0.963*** 0.993 1.473*** 1.100*** 0.994** 
 
(0.033) (0.005) (0.005) (0.083) (0.014) (0.002) 
# of patents in cited yr.^2 0.992*** 1.000*** 1.000 0.993*** 0.998*** 1.000*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of claims made 1.016*** 1.015*** 1.011*** 1.017*** 1.014*** 1.009*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
# of cited references 1.002 0.983*** 0.991*** 0.998 1.003 1.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
75th quantile 
      Cite lag 1.020 0.982*** 0.931*** 0.965*** 0.987 0.881*** 
 
(0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.016) (0.008) 
Cite lag^2 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.999** 1.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Stock of patents 0.995*** 0.997*** 0.994*** 0.992*** 0.998*** 0.994*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
# of patents in cited yr. 1.105*** 0.989** 0.995 1.179*** 1.132*** 0.993** 
 
(0.031) (0.004) (0.004) (0.042) (0.013) (0.002) 
# of patents in cited yr.^2 0.989*** 1.000 1.000* 0.997*** 0.998*** 1.000*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of claims made 1.017*** 1.009*** 1.010*** 1.011*** 1.012*** 1.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
# of cited references 1.002 0.989*** 0.986*** 0.999 1.000 1.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
50th quantile 
      Cite lag 1.016 0.984** 0.950*** 0.963*** 1.015 0.884*** 
 
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.010) 
Cite lag^2 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.998*** 1.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock of patents 0.995*** 0.997*** 0.995*** 0.991*** 0.999** 0.994*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
# of patents in cited yr. 1.079*** 0.998 0.996 1.199*** 1.072*** 0.993** 
 
(0.024) (0.004) (0.004) (0.044) (0.009) (0.002) 
# of patents in cited yr.^2 0.991*** 1.000* 1.000 0.997*** 0.999*** 1.000*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
# of claims made 1.013*** 1.006*** 1.007*** 1.008*** 1.006*** 1.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
# of cited references 1.001 0.990*** 0.989*** 1.000 0.999 0.999 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table 7 – Patent Characteristic Quantile Results by Technology (continued) 
 
25th quantile 
      Cite lag 1.015 0.976*** 0.948*** 0.953*** 0.994 
 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) 
 Cite lag^2 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.999*** 0.999** 0.999** 
 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
 Stock of patents 0.996*** 0.998*** 0.995*** 0.992*** 0.999*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
 # of patents in cited yr. 1.075** 0.998 0.996 1.210*** 1.065*** 
 
 
(0.025) (0.004) (0.004) (0.052) (0.010) 
 # of patents in cited yr.^2 0.992*** 1.000* 1.000 0.997*** 0.999*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 # of claims made 1.013*** 1.005*** 1.006*** 1.006*** 1.005*** 
 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 # of cited references 1.000 0.991*** 0.990*** 0.999 0.999 
   (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)   
 
 
 
Table 8 – Assignee Characteristic Results by Technology 
90th quantile wind solar fuel cells nuclear hybrid efficiency 
Foreign corp. assignee 0.466*** 0.608*** 0.567*** 0.517*** 1.022 0.929** 
 
(0.041) (0.025) (0.017) (0.016) (0.051) (0.021) 
US individual assignee 0.737*** 0.747*** 0.505*** 0.650*** 1.130 1.188*** 
 
(0.038) (0.024) (0.036) (0.053) (0.095) (0.033) 
Foreign individual  0.573*** 0.461*** 0.342*** 0.290*** 0.516*** 0.707*** 
 
(0.040) (0.026) (0.057) (0.046) (0.077) (0.038) 
US government assignee 1.123 1.245* 0.956 0.371*** 1.463 0.613** 
 
(0.148) (0.130) (0.063) (0.024) (0.569) (0.105) 
Foreign government  0.862 0.685*** 0.427*** 0.520*** 0.689 0.623* 
 
(0.157) (0.058) (0.082) (0.031) (0.243) (0.136) 
US university assignee 0.334*** 0.942 0.890 0.328*** 1.519* 0.974 
 
(0.083) (0.085) (0.055) (0.092) (0.323) (0.093) 
Foreign university  0.905 0.506** 0.425*** 0.086 0.000 0.331 
 
(0.203) (0.134) (0.110) (172.546) (5.778) (0.305) 
US institution assignee 0.582** 0.865 0.693*** 0.383*** 0.945 0.937 
 
(0.097) (0.133) (0.050) (0.072) (0.276) (0.142) 
Foreign institution  0.243** 0.306*** 0.409*** 0.437*** 0.654 0.927 
 
(0.107) (0.070) (0.045) (0.079) (0.214) (0.098) 
Child of US govt. patent 1.259** 1.754*** 1.432*** 1.065 1.330** 4.942*** 
 
(0.105) (0.092) (0.043) (0.039) (0.121) (1.048) 
Child of For. govt. patent 1.680*** 1.768*** 1.624*** 1.332*** 1.361 0.909 
  (0.193) (0.096) (0.075) (0.045) (0.223) (0.239) 
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Table 8 – Assignee Characteristic Results by Technology (continued) 
75th quantile 
      Foreign corporation  0.454*** 0.707*** 0.575*** 0.639*** 1.232*** 0.922*** 
 
(0.034) (0.020) (0.017) (0.013) (0.062) (0.021) 
US individual assignee 0.774*** 0.843*** 0.448*** 0.717*** 1.035 1.170*** 
 
(0.038) (0.019) (0.032) (0.037) (0.096) (0.032) 
Foreign individual  0.581*** 0.574*** 0.303*** 0.465*** 0.574*** 0.685*** 
 
(0.039) (0.024) (0.046) (0.035) (0.068) (0.039) 
US government  1.457* 1.138* 1.209** 0.551*** 1.205 0.562 
 
(0.224) (0.068) (0.083) (0.020) (0.506) (0.284) 
Foreign government  0.898 0.756*** 0.415*** 0.660*** 0.887 0.580 
 
(0.206) (0.047) (0.048) (0.023) (0.259) (0.184) 
US university assignee 0.340*** 0.929 0.790*** 0.492*** 1.893 0.985 
 
(0.070) (0.068) (0.056) (0.090) (0.678) (0.098) 
Foreign university  0.763 0.570** 0.362*** 0.061 0.000 0.240 
 
(0.163) (0.108) (0.093) (20115.22) (209.060) (2.86e+05) 
US institution assignee 0.782 0.800 0.712*** 0.571*** 1.377 0.811 
 
(0.171) (0.108) (0.065) (0.063) (0.411) (0.227) 
Foreign institution  0.222 0.407*** 0.438*** 0.609*** 0.481** 0.862 
 
(59330.6) (0.061) (0.046) (0.053) (0.116) (0.123) 
Child of US govt. patent 1.505*** 1.474*** 2.009*** 1.033 1.593*** 2.435*** 
 
(0.124) (0.049) (0.067) (0.026) (0.193) (0.267) 
Child of For. govt. patent 1.974*** 1.391*** 1.819*** 1.268*** 1.484** 0.832 
  (0.198) (0.046) (0.106) (0.032) (0.218) (0.241) 
50th quantile 
      Foreign corporation  0.555*** 0.703*** 0.678*** 0.644*** 1.171*** 0.913*** 
 
(0.033) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.043) (0.023) 
US individual assignee 0.821*** 0.857*** 0.542*** 0.739*** 0.945 1.174*** 
 
(0.034) (0.019) (0.030) (0.038) (0.057) (0.034) 
Foreign individual  0.665*** 0.598*** 0.429*** 0.483*** 0.703*** 0.683*** 
 
(0.034) (0.024) (0.050) (0.037) (0.058) (0.064) 
US government assignee 1.397* 1.164* 1.157* 0.559*** 0.957 0.441 
 
(0.212) (0.069) (0.067) (0.021) (0.761) (1.13e+05) 
Foreign government  0.810 0.748*** 0.521*** 0.664*** 0.871 0.558 
 
(0.165) (0.048) (0.048) (0.024) (1.201) (0.488) 
US university assignee 0.403*** 0.929 0.781*** 0.295 1.068 0.749 
 
(0.108) (0.065) (0.045) (69439.18) (0.219) (2.57e+05) 
Foreign university  0.785 0.456 0.418*** 0.019 0.000 0.227 
 
(0.178) (67961.09) (0.083) (25929.77) (19382.3) (3.01e+05) 
US institution assignee 0.793 0.766* 0.719*** 0.567*** 1.278 0.785 
 
(0.186) (0.099) (0.054) (0.073) (0.457) (40.803) 
Foreign institution  0.119 0.377 0.542*** 0.611*** 0.609 0.780 
 
(7.9e+05) (0.263) (0.049) (0.058) (0.206) (90533.9) 
Child of US govt. patent 1.362*** 1.438*** 1.946*** 1.032 1.404*** 2.322*** 
 
(0.097) (0.046) (0.060) (0.025) (0.124) (0.291) 
Child of For. govt. patent 1.968*** 1.327*** 1.745*** 1.238*** 1.184 0.829 
  (0.181) (0.041) (0.092) (0.028) (0.132) (0.837) 
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Table 8 – Assignee Characteristic Results by Technology (continued) 
25th quantile 
      Foreign corporation  0.557*** 0.714*** 0.697*** 0.646*** 1.148*** 
 
 
(0.035) (0.020) (0.016) (0.013) (0.043) 
 US individual assignee 0.832*** 0.860*** 0.556*** 0.749*** 0.961 
 
 
(0.036) (0.020) (0.031) (0.042) (0.059) 
 Foreign individual  0.670*** 0.635*** 0.478*** 0.419 0.726*** 
 
 
(0.036) (0.026) (0.058) (5136.148) (0.065) 
 US government assignee 1.421* 1.158* 1.136* 0.571*** 0.544 
 
 
(0.235) (0.073) (0.063) (0.023) (1.37e+06) 
 Foreign government  0.786 0.732*** 0.555*** 0.649*** 0.572 
 
 
(0.203) (0.058) (0.055) (0.026) (2.62e+05) 
 US university assignee 0.206 0.930 0.794*** 0.334 0.936 
 
 
(7.79e+05) (0.069) (0.043) (99672.705) (1.152) 
 Foreign university  0.329 0.360 0.367 0.019 0.002 
 
 
(1.23e+06) (2.05e+05) (1.08e+05) (43248.828) (1.06e+05) 
 US institution assignee 0.768 0.679 0.747*** 0.542*** 0.522 
 
 
(0.246) (1.91e+05) (0.053) (0.086) (3.55e+06) 
 Foreign institution  0.027 0.230 0.532** 0.592*** 0.733 
 
 
(1.92e+05) (68282.460) (0.129) (0.076) (0.133) 
 Child of US govt. patent 1.358*** 1.414*** 1.822*** 1.042 1.397*** 
 
 
(0.102) (0.047) (0.052) (0.027) (0.125) 
 Child of For. govt. patent 1.923*** 1.298*** 1.691*** 1.213*** 1.214 
   (0.190) (0.042) (0.084) (0.030) (0.139)   
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Figure 1 – Successful U.S. Patent Applications by Priority Year 
 
 
The figure shows successful U.S. patent applications for each of our six technologies, sorted by 
priority date.  Note that our data only include granted patents.  Thus, patent counts in the last 
years of the sample are truncated, as some patent applications from these years have yet to be 
processed. 
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Figure 2 – Sample Citation Frequency Distributions 
A. Citations to hybrid patents,1991 
 
B. Citations to wind energy patents,1981 
 
 
(continued on next page) 
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C. Citations to solar energy patents,1981 
 
 
Each figure shows the distribution of forward citations received by patents from a given priority 
year and for a given technology.  The x-axis shows the number of forward citations received, and 
the y-axis shows the number of patents receiving that many forward citations. 
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Figure 3 – Effect of cite lag by technology 
A. Based on estimates from Table 5 
 
B. Based on estimates from Table 6 
45 
 
Figure 4 – Years affected by diminishing returns 
 
The figure shows patent counts sorted by priority year for the three technologies where 
diminishing returns varies depending on the number of patents.  Years affected by diminishing 
returns are shown with dashed lines. 
 
A1 
 
Appendix A – List of IPC Classes Used 
Electric/Hybrid Vehicles 
B60W 20  VEHICLES IN GENERAL/CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-
UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; 
CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID 
VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR 
PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR 
SUB-UNIT /Control systems specially adapted for hybrid vehicles, i.e. 
vehicles having two or more prime movers of more than one type, e.g. 
electrical and internal combustion motors, all used for propulsion of the 
vehicle   
B60L 7 VEHICLES IN GENERAL/ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT OR 
PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; 
MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; 
ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES, IN 
GENERAL/ Electrodynamic brake systems for vehicles in general   
B60L 8 VEHICLES IN GENERAL/ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT OR 
PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; 
MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; 
ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES, IN 
GENERAL/ Electric propulsion with power supply from force of nature, 
e.g. sun, wind   
B60L 11 VEHICLES IN GENERAL/ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT OR 
PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; 
MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; 
ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES, IN 
GENERAL/ Electric propulsion with power supplied within the vehicle   
NOT B60L 7/28 VEHICLES IN GENERAL/ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT OR 
PROPULSION OF ELECTRICALLY-PROPELLED VEHICLES; 
MAGNETIC SUSPENSION OR LEVITATION FOR VEHICLES; 
ELECTRODYNAMIC BRAKE SYSTEMS FOR VEHICLES, IN 
GENERAL/ Electrodynamic brake systems for vehicles in general/Eddy-
current braking 
 
Energy efficiency 
keywords only:  ((((((energy OR fuel OR gas* OR electric* OR petrol*) <near/1> 
(consum* OR use OR using OR usage OR burn*)) <near/3> (reduc* OR 
less OR lower)) <in> (AB, TI, BACKGROUND)) OR ((((energy OR fuel 
OR gas*) <near/1> (efficien* OR economy OR mileage OR productivity)) 
<near/3> (improv* OR increas* OR better OR greater)) <in> (AB, TI, 
BACKGROUND))) 
 
 
A2 
 
Fuel cells 
H01M 8 PROCESSES OR MEANS, e.g. BATTERIES, FOR THE DIRECT 
CONVERSION OF CHEMICAL ENERGY INTO ELECTRICAL 
ENERGY/Fuel cells; Manufacture thereof 
 
 
Nuclear Energy 
G21B NUCLEONICS/NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING/ 
FUSION REACTORS 
G21C NUCLEONICS/NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING/ 
NUCLEAR REACTORS 
G21D NUCLEONICS/NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING/ 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
 
 
Solar energy 
F03G 6 MACHINES OR ENGINES FOR LIQUIDS; WIND, SPRING, OR 
WEIGHT MOTORS; PRODUCING MECHANICAL POWER OR A 
REACTIVE PROPULSIVE THRUST, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED 
FOR/ SPRING, WEIGHT, INERTIA, OR LIKE MOTORS; 
MECHANICAL-POWER-PRODUCING DEVICES OR MECHANISMS, 
NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR OR USING ENERGY SOURCES 
NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR /Devices for producing mechanical 
power from solar energy 
F24J 2 MECHANICAL ENGINEERING; LIGHTING; HEATING; WEAPONS; 
BLASTING/HEATING, RANGES, VENTILATING/PRODUCTION OR 
USE OF HEAT NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR/Use of solar heat, 
e.g. solar heat collectors 
H01L 27/142 ELECTRICITY/BASIC ELECTRIC ELEMENTS/ SEMICONDUCTOR 
DEVICES; ELECTRIC SOLID STATE DEVICES NOT OTHERWISE 
PROVIDED FOR/ Devices consisting of a plurality of semiconductor or 
other solid-state components formed in or on a common 
substrate/including semiconductor components specially adapted for 
rectifying, oscillating, amplifying or switching and having at least one 
potential-jump barrier or surface barrier; including integrated passive 
circuit elements with at least one potential-jump barrier or surface 
barrier/energy conversion devices 
H01L 31/04-058 ELECTRICITY/BASIC ELECTRIC ELEMENTS/ SEMICONDUCTOR 
DEVICES; ELECTRIC SOLID STATE DEVICES NOT OTHERWISE 
PROVIDED FOR/ Semiconductor devices sensitive to infra-red radiation, 
light, electromagnetic radiation of shorter wavelength, or corpuscular 
radiation and specially adapted either for the conversion of the energy of 
such radiation into electrical energy or for the control of electrical energy 
by such radiation; Processes or apparatus specially adapted for the 
manufacture or treatment thereof or of parts thereof; Details 
A3 
 
thereof/Adapted as conversion devices/ including a panel or array of 
photoelectric cells, e.g. solar cells 
H02N 6 ELECTRICITY/ GENERATION, CONVERSION, OR DISTRIBUTION 
OF ELECTRIC POWER/ELECTRIC MACHINES NOT OTHERWISE 
PROVIDED FOR/ Generators in which light radiation is directly 
converted into electrical energy 
 
 
Wind 
F03D MACHINES OR ENGINES FOR LIQUIDS; WIND, SPRING, OR 
WEIGHT MOTORS; PRODUCING MECHANICAL POWER OR A 
REACTIVE PROPULSIVE THRUST, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED 
FOR/Wind Motors 
 
 
